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INCONSISTENT GATEKEEPING IN
FEDERAL COURTS: APPLICATION OF




With the rise in the use of expert testimony in federal courts,
judges are increasingly called upon to rule on the difficult issue of
admissibility.' The appropriate standard for admissibility of expert
testimony has always been a matter of great debate, and disputes
on the issue continue today.2 The landmark Supreme Court deci-
sion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.3 reflects an
attempt to bring clarity to this controversial area of evidence law.4
The Court resolved a conflict among lower courts with regard to
the admission of scientific expert testimony by holding that the
Federal Rules of Evidence (Evidence Rules) superseded a well-
established common law rule.6 The decision also created a frame-
work for the application of the Evidence Rules to scientific expert
testimony.7 However, in resolving one controversy the Court cre-
ated another. By focusing on the standard for admissibility of sci-
entific expert testimony, the Daubert decision created significant
ambiguity in the admissibility standard for other types of expert
testimony governed by the Evidence Rules.8 As a result, the cir-
1. See Developments in the Law: Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific
Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1509 (1995) [hereinafter Developments].
2. See id.; see also Michael C. Polentz, Comment, Post-Daubert Confusion with
Expert Testimony, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1187,1187 & n.1 (1996).
3. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
4. See id. at 585 ("We granted certiorari, in light of sharp divisions among the
courts regarding the proper standard for the admission of expert testimony."
(citation omitted)).
5. The Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1975. Act of Jan. 2, 1975,
Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. app. (1994)).
6. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 & n.6.
7. See id. at 589-94.
8. See id. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1379
1380 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
cuit courts are now split on whether and how to apply Daubert's
principles to nonscientific expert testimony proffered in federal
courts. 9
Courts have always treated the admission of scientific expert
evidence differently from other types of expert evidence. In de-
termining the admissibility of nonscientific expert testimony,
courts have traditionally focused on the expert's qualifications and
the helpfulness of the testimony to a jury, omitting an inquiry into
the reliability of the testimony. 0 In contrast, courts have subjected
scientific expert testimony to a stricter standard."
After the Frye v. United States12 decision in 1923, most federal
courts13 required the party offering scientific expert testimony to
establish that the expert's theory was generally accepted within the
relevant scientific community. The enactment of the Evidence
Rules in 1975'5 called into question the continued viability of the
"general acceptance" test." Under a literal reading of Rule 702 of
the Evidence Rules, a judge may admit the testimony of a quali-
fied expert if the testimony will help the jur understand the evi-
dence and determine the facts in the case.' Neither the text of
Rule 702 nor its legislative history mentions the general accep-
tance test. 18 Therefore, some courts concluded that Rule 702 had
superseded Frye,19 while others continued to require general accep-
9. See supra Part III.
10. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a
Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Ex-
pert Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2281 (1994); John William Strong, Lan-
guage and Logic in Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert Testimony by Restrictions of
Function, Reliability, and Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349,361-62 (1992).
11. See Strong, supra note 10, at 362.
12. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
13. See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE § 1-5, at 9 & nn.53-55 (2d ed. 1993).
14. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014. This principle came to be known as the "general ac-
ceptance" test. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-86.
15. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. app. (1994)).
16. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587 n.5 (citing contradictory opinions on the survival
of the Frye test expressed by the circuit courts and the leading evidence experts).
17. See FED. R. EVID. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.").
18. See Jay P. Kesan, Note, An Autopsy of Scientific Evidence in a Post-Daubert
World, 84 GEo. L.J. 1985, 1993 (1996).
19. See, e.g., Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1142 (7th Cir.
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tance in the relevant scientific community as a condition for ad-
missibility of scientific testimony.2 In 1993 the Supreme Court re-
solved the question in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.21 The Court held that the Evidence Rules had superseded the
Frye test.'
In rejecting Frye, the Daubert Court formulated a new test for
admissibility of expert testimony from the language of Rule 702.3
The Court held that all expert testimony must be (1) relevant and
(2) reliable.24 In establishing the new test, the Court specifically
focused on the words "scientific... knowledge" in Rule 702. 2 Ac-
cording to Daubert, scientific expert testimony must be based upon
sound scientific methodology in order to be admissible.5 In dicta,
described as "general observations," the majority articulated four
nonexclusive factors for determining scientific knowledge27 and en-
trusted trial judges with the gatekeeping function of deciding
whether expert evidence satisfies the Daubert test and thus quali-
fies for admission under Rule 702.8
While resolving the Frye controversy over the need for gen-
eral acceptance of scientific expert evidence,29 the Daubert inter-
pretation of Rule 702 left unanswered several important ques-
tions." In his dissent Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed concern
about questions that trial courts were certain to face when tryingto decipher and apply the majority's dicta to proffered expert tes-
1985) ("Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines the scope of permissible
expert testimony very broadly. The rule... indicate[s] that such testimony is admis-
sible whenever it concerns a topic on which a lay jury would be assisted by such tes-
timony . . . ."); see also 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE,
702[03], at 702-44 & n.5 (1995) (discussing circuit cases rejecting the Frye standard).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that Rule 702 is not satisfied "[u]nless the testimony conforms to a generally
accepted explanatory theory"); see also WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, 702[03],
at 702-45 & n.7 (discussing circuit cases that continued to require "general accep-
tance" within the relevant scientific community).
21. 509 U.S. at 589.
22. See id. at 589 & n.6.
23. For the text of Rule 702, see supra note 17.
24. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
25. Id. at 589-90.
26. See id. at 590.
27. The Daubert factors include (1) the testability of the proffered theory, (2) its
submission to peer review and publication, (3) the error rate, and (4) its level of gen-
eral acceptance within a relevant scientific community. See id. at 593-94.
28. See id. at 589.
29. See icL
30. See id. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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timony:
Does all of this dicta apply to an expert seeking to testify
on the basis of "technical or other specialized knowl-
edge"-the other types of expert knowledge to which
Rule 702 applies-or are the "general observations" lim-
ited only to "scientific knowledge"? What is the differ-
ence between scientific knowledge and technical knowl-
edge; does Rule 702 actually contemplate that the phrase
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" be
broken down into numerous subspecies of expertise, or
did its authors simply pick general descriptive language
covering the sort of expert testimony which courts have
customarily received?31
This Comment proposes answers to some of the questions
raised by Justice Rehnquist: What is the appropriate scope of
Daubert? Should it be limited to scientific expert testimony or
does it also apply to other types of expert evidence offered in fed-
eral courts? And, most importantly, if the Daubert opinion ex-
tends beyond the realm of scientific expert testimony, how should
lower courts apply its mandates to "technical, or other specialized
knowledge"; in other words, nonscientific expert testimony?
Part II of this Comment presents the background of the
Daubert decision and a brief summary of the case. It also com-
ments on the ambiguity surrounding Daubert's scope and applica-
tion. Part III contains a discussion of how federal courts have
applied Daubert to nonscientific expert testimony. Part IV ad-
dresses the scope of Daubert. It first defines the word "science" as
used by the Daubert Court. It then suggests extending Daubert's
reliability principles to all types of expert testimony, while limiting
the application of its four-part test to scientific expert testimony.
Finally, Part V proposes a framework for the analysis of nonscien-
tific expert testimony in light of Daubert. It suggests a method of
ensuring that all nonscientific expert testimony meets Daubert's
reliability requirement. It recommends that as gatekeepers, the
trial courts should always look beyond experts' credentials and ex-
amine the data on which experts rely and the reasoning or meth-
odology experts use in arriving at their conclusions.
31. Id, (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 30:1379
NONSCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY
II. THE DAUBERT DECISION
Under Rule 702 of the Evidence Rules, a qualified expert wit-
ness may give opinion testimony that contains "scientific, techni-
cal, or other specialized knowledge" helpful to the trier of fact.32 A
witness may be "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education." 33  The drafters phrased the rule
broadly so as to allow testimony based not only on scientific but
"all 'specialized' knowledge."' ' Similarly, the scope of the rule ex-
tends beyond traditional experts, such as scientists, to the large
number of so-called "skilled" witnesses, such as bankers and real
35estate owners.
A. Pre-Daubert Interpretations of Rule 702: Nonscientific and
Scientific Expert Testimony
The traditional test for admissibility of nonscientific expert
testimony under Rule 702 requires a "minimal showing" that "the
witness qualifies as an expert and that the testimony will be helpful
to the trier of fact., 36 Commentators described the Rule 702 stan-
dard as "very generous" and favoring the admissibility of all rele-
vant testimony. Professor Strong has called the traditional ap-
proach "laissez-faire" and attributed most of its development to
Wigmore's famous test:" "On this subject can a jury receive from
this person appreciable help?"39 Similar to this test is Professor
McCormick's "relevancy standard,"4 which focuses on the rele-
vancy of expert evidence as the "key to admissibility., 41 Under
32. FED. R. EVID. 702.
33. Id.
34. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
35. See id.
36. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 2281.
37. See Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, A Practical Guide to the Admissibility of Novel
Expert Evidence in Criminal Trials Under Federal Rule 702, 22 ST. MARY'S LJ. 181,
207 (1990); see also WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, 702[02], at 702-36 to 702-37
("Because of the Federal Rules' emphasis on liberalizing expert testimony, doubts
about whether an expert's testimony will be useful should generally be resolved in
favor of admissibility....").
38. See Strong, supra note 10, at 361.
39. 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1923, at
29 (James H. Chadbourn rev., 1978).
40. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 604-10
(Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984). Professor McCormick stated that "[a]ny rele-
vant conclusions supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless
there are distinct reasons for exclusion." Id. at 608.
41. Kesan, supra note 18, at 1994.
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these traditional approaches, most courts determine the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony based on the specialized nature of the sub-
ject matter and the personal qualifications of the expert4 without
examining the reliability of the principles underlying the expert
testimony. 3 The "weight" to be given to these principles and the
expert testimony based upon them is then left to the jury.
44
Courts have not been as lenient in their approach to the ad-
missibility of scientific expert evidence. 45 When the Evidence
Rules were enacted in 1975,4' most courts were following the gen-
eral acceptance standar 4 articulated in Frye v. United StateS.48 To
be admitted into evidence under Frye, the proponent of a novel
scientific theory had to establish its general acceptance within the
relevant scientific community.49  The adoption of the Evidence
Rules caused an extensive debate among courts and commentators
regarding the continuing viability of the Frye test. 0 The broad
language of Rule 702 led some courts to interpret the rule as im-
posing no special reliability restriction on scientific expert testi-
mony beyond the traditional relevancy, helpfulness, and qvualifica-
tion requirements applicable to all expert testimony . Most
courts, however, continued to inquire into the reliability of novel
scientific theories presented to the jury. 2
While assessing the credibility of a witness's testimony has
been traditionally the jury's role, 3 this task becomes problematic
42. See Strong, supra note 10, at 362.
43. See id.; Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 2281.
44. See Strong, supra note 10, at 364.
45. See id. at 362 (noting that the court's treatment of scientific evidence stood in
contrast to the standards for other types of expert testimony).
46. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. app. (1994)).
47. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 13, at 9 & nn.53, 55.
48. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
49. See id. at 8.
50. See Kesan, supra note 18, at 1993.
51. See Richard Nahas, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Requiem
For Frye: The Supreme Court Lays to Rest the Common Law Standard For Admit-
ting Scientific Evidence in the Federal Courts, 29 NEw ENG. L. REV. 93, 105 (1994);
see also WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, 702[03], at 702-44 & n.5 (describing cases
responding to the adoption of Rule 702 by rejecting the Frye standard).
52. See WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, $ 702[03], at 702-45 & n.6; Kesan, supra
note 18, at 1995.
53. See Developments, supra note 1, at 1510-11 ("Traditionally, the judge rules
on the admissibility and sufficiency of expert testimony, whereas the jury evaluates
the testimony's credibility and weight." (footnote omitted)).
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when novel scientific theories are involved.M Both courts and
commentators have expressed doubts about jurors' abilities to as-
sess complex scientific evidence.55 One commentator stated that:
When the evidence is of technical nature, it may be un-
realistic to expect juries to weigh scientific assessments
based on the credibility of expert witnesses. Indeed,
placing such demands on juries would violate Rule 403's
standard of prejudice since the probative value of the evi-
dence could be outweighed by the danger of confusion of
the issues and the potential for misleading the jury. 6
The prevailing concern has been that jurors' lack of knowl-
edge and training impedes their ability to assess scientific expert
testimony on its merits and causes them to give the testimony too
much weight.y These concerns have been bolstered by surveys
showing that the majority of people serving on juries find paid ex-
perts believable, even though "a significant fraction of [their] ex-
pert testimony invites lay jurors to reach conclusions not grounded
in any scientific theory or methodology."58 These concerns have
fueled the debate over whether the judge is better suited to evalu-
ate the reliability of scientific expert testimony. 9
In response to doubts about jurors' ability to accurately weigh
scientific expert testimony and calls for greater restrictions on
admissibility of such testimony,60 most courts assumed the role of
gatekeeper and screened scientific testimony for reliability.
6'
While some courts continued to follow the Frye standard after the
54. See Kesan, supra note 18, at 1988; Nahas, supra note 51, at 107.
55. See United States v. Amarel, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating that
expert testimony has a great potential to influence a jury "because of its aura of spe-
cial reliability and trustworthiness"); Developments, supra note 1, at 1511; Kesan, su-
pra note 18, at 1988; Nahas, supra note 51, at 107.
56. Nahas, supra note 51, at 107.
57. See Kesan, supra note 18, at 1988 & n.13.
58. Id. at 1988.
59. See Developments, supra note 1, at 1510-11.
60. See Michael C. McCarthy, Note, "Helpful" or "Reasonably Reliable"? Ana-
lyzing the Expert Witness's Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and
703, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 350, 350 n.1 (1992); Ernest J. Getto & Cynthia H. Cwik,
Keep 'Junk' Science Off the Stand, NAT'L L.J., April 19, 1993, at 15.
61. For a discussion of the reliability tests the courts used to evaluate the reliabil-
ity of scientific evidence, see Kesan, supra note 18, at 1995-97; Nahas, supra note 51,
at 108-10; Joseph B. Spero, Note, Much Ado About Nothing-The Supreme Court
Still Fails to Solve the General Acceptance Problem Regarding Expert Testimony and
Scientific Evidence, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 245,254-60 (1993-94).
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enactment of Rule 702, many courts began deviating from Frye,62
creating new reliability tests for scientific testimony.63 Many courts
focused on the reliability of the scientific technique, the legal rele-
vance of the testimony, and its prejudicial effect on the jury.6
Some courts included Frye's general acceptance standard as one
factor in their tests for admissibility.6 Some courts specifically re-
lied on the Frye rule,6 while others explicitly ignored or rejected
it.67 As courts continued to treat the Frye standard in a contradic-
tory fashion,6 the Supreme Court stepped in to resolve the
"divisions among the courts regarding the proper standard for the
admission of expert testimony."69
B. Majority Opinion in Daubert
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.7° two minor
children and their parents sued Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, al-
leging that the children's severe birth defects resulted from their
mothers' ingestion during pregnancy of Bendictin, an antinausea
drug marketed by Merrell DOW.71 The district court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis of the de-
fendant's expert testimony that no scientific study had found a
significant relationship between Bendictin and birth defects. 2 The
62. See Spero, supra note 61, at 254-55.
63. See Kesan, supra note 18, at 1995-97; Spero, supra note 61, at 254-60.
64. See Spero, supra note 61, at 254-60.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1992)
(taking into consideration the general acceptance by experts in the field as a part of
the admissibility analysis); Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106,
1110 (5th Cir. 1991) (combining Rule 702 with the Frye standard); United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237-39 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that the acceptance within
the scientific community is one of the factors trial courts must consider in deciding
the admissibility of the proffered scientific evidence).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that Rule 702 is not satisfied "[u]nless the testimony conforms to a generally
accepted explanatory theory"); United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir.
1986) (holding that Rule 702 incorporates the Frye standard through its helpfulness
requirement).
67. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 849-50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(rejecting the Frye standard and favoring the test articulated in Downing).
68. See, e.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 955 (3d
Cir. 1990) (rejecting the general acceptance standard); United States v. Shorter, 809
F.2d 54,59-60 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying the general acceptance standard).
69. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993).
70. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
71. See id. at 582.
72. See id. at 583-84.
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court held the plaintiffs' expert testimony inadmissible to establish
causation because it did not meet the general acceptance standard
articulated in Frye.73 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, citing Frye as the proper standard for admissibility and
concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy their burden of
proof of causation.74
The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decision and
held that the Frye rule had been superseded by the enactment of
the Evidence Rules.75 The Court stated that the Frye standard was
"austere ... [] incompatible with ... the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, [and] should not be applied in federal trials., 76 The Court
then articulated a new test for admissibility of scientific expert tes-
timony and listed several nonexclusive factors that federal courts
should consider when faced with a proffer of such testimony.7
The Daubert Court held that Rule 702, in conjunction with
other Evidence Rules, assigned to the trial court the gatekeeping
function of "ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a re-
liable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand., 78 The Court
added that "[p]ertinent evidence based on scientifically valid prin-
ciples" will satisfy these requirements.79
The Court in Daubert interpreted Rule 702 as entrusting a
trial judge with the responsibility of ensuring that an expert is testi-
fying to "(1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact
to understand or determine a fact in issue."8  The phrase
"scientific knowledge" in Rule 702 requires that "the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony [be] scientifically valid."81
The term "scientific" signifies "a grounding in the methods and
procedures of science," and "knowledge" is "more than subjective
belief or unsupported speculation.8 12 The requirement of scientific
knowledge "establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.
' 3
The Court then offered general observations as to how to de-
73. See id. at 583.
74. See id. at 584.
75. See id. at 588-89 & n.6.
76. Id. at 589.
77. See id. at 592-94.
78. Id. at 597.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 592.
81. Id. at 592-93.
82. Id. at 590.
83. Id.
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termine "whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge
that will assist the trier of fact."" The Court enumerated four
nonexclusive factors that trial courts should consider: (1) whether
a scientific theory can and has been tested; (2) whether it has been
subjected to peer review; (3) its rate of error; and (4) its deiree of
general acceptance within the relevant scientific community.
C. Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
In his dissent Justice Rehnquist raised several questions the
majority opinion did not address. 6 The majority opinion left un-
clear whether Daubert's factors also apply to expert testimony
based on "technical or other specialized knowledge" and whether
they are limited to the scientific knowledge portion of Rule 702."
The majority opinion also failed to explain the difference between
scientific and technical knowledge. s Justice Rehnquist expressed
concern that these ambiguities would cause confusion among trial
courts applying Daubert to different types of expert testimony.89
D. Post-Daubert Confusion Over the Scope of the Decision
It is important to note that the central holding of Daubert fo-
cused on the admissibility of scientific expert testimony.90 It re-
solved the issue concerning the viability of the Frye standard-the
test dealing exclusively with novel scientific evidence.9' In fact,
Justice Blackmun began the Court's opinion by stating that they
were "called upon to determine the standard for admitting expert
scientific testimony in a federal trial";92 Justice Blackmun later
added that the discussion was "limited to the scientific context be-
cause that is the nature of the expertise offered" in the case.93 Yet
the test articulated in Daubert was based on Rule 702-a Rule that
84. Id. at 593.
85. See id. at 593-94.
86. See id. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89. See id at 600-01 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90. See id. at 589.
91. See id. at 585-89. It must be noted, however, that the type of evidence sub-
ject to the Frye standard has never been made entirely clear. See Strong, supra note
10, at 362 n.51.
92. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 590 n.8. But unlike Frye, the Daubert opinion is not limited to novel
scientific testimony. See id. at 589 (referring to "all scientific testimony").
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NONSCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY
also addresses technical and "'other specialized knowledge." '94
As the Supreme Court focused on one portion of Rule 702, it
left the remainder of the Rule open to interpretation. 95 The Court
never clarified whether and how the Daubert analysis ought to be
applied to other types of expert knowledge. 96 It never explained
the relevance of its four-part test to nonscientific expert testimony
nor the extent of the trial judges' gatekeeping function the deci-
sion requires. While entrusting federal judges to screen all expert
testimony in a manner consistent with Daubert, the Court did not
clarify the proper scope of the Daubert opinion.
III. POST-DAUBERT CIRCUrr CASES INVOLVING NONSCIENTIFIC
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Since the Daubert decision in 1993, most circuit courts have
addressed Justice Rehnquist's questions concerning the trial
judge's role in screening nonscientific expert evidence.9 Initially,
some commentators thought the Daubert ruling applied only to the
scientific theories previously subject to the Frye test.98 More re-
cently, however, commentators have expressed the belief that
Daubert's general principles apply to all types of expert evidence.99
The circuit courts are clearly in conflict on this issue.
Post-Daubert decisions reveal a wide spectrum of judicial ap-
proaches to interpreting the scope of Daubert and its application
to nonscientific expert evidence. Sections A and B discuss the cir-
cuit cases on the opposite sides of the spectrum-those that liter-
ally apply the Daubert four-prong test to nonscientific expert tes-
timony and those that refuse to extend Daubert to nonscientific
testimony at all. Section C focuses on the group of cases that con-
stitute a middle ground-applying Daubert's principles but not the
94. Id. at 589 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
95. See id. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Is Science a Special Case? The Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1779, 1782 (1995) ("Since
Daubert was decided,.., both courts and commentators have begun to realize that
the decision actually creates at least as many problems as it solves.").
97. For a discussion of the pertinent part of Justice Rehnquist's dissent see supra
Part II.C.
98. See Rorie Sherman, 'Junk Science' Rule Used Broadly, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 4,
1993, at 3.
99. See G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Di-
lemma, and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHrON L. REV. 939, 972 (1996); Kesan, supra note
18, at 2026-27.
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four-part analysis formulated for scientific expert testimony. The
cases discussed in Section C indicate the general trend in this area
of law and are useful in formulating suggestions for the proper
application of Daubert to nonscientific expert testimony.' Finally,
Section D addresses the decisions of several circuits that have ex-
tended Daubert to nonscientific expert testimony in some cases but
refused to do so in others.
The distinction between scientific and nonscientific expert
testimony is discussed in greater detail in Part IV.A. For the pur-
pose of analyzing the courts' attitudes toward nonscientific expert
testimony, this survey is limited to those cases where the courts
classified the questioned testimony as nonscientific.
A. Literal Application of the Daubert Test to Nonscientific
Testimony
Footnote eight in Daubert states unambiguously that the
Court's general observations on how to assess the reliability of ex-
pert testimony are limited to the scientific context "because that is
the nature of the expertise offered" in that case.1 ' But in at least
one case, a lower court has taken Daubert's four-part analysis be-
yond the realm of science.
In Berry v. City of Detroit0 the expert witness was a retired
sheriff with a degree in sociology and four years of work experi-
ence at the Department of Justice. 03He testified as to whether the
police department's alleged failure to discipline officers was the
proximate cause of an officer shooting a victim.1 O4 The court rec-
ognized that the testimony was nonscientific but proceeded to ap-
ply the four Daubert factors.'05 The testimony failed the test be-
cause there was no indication that the police discipline theory had
been formally tested, published after peer review, or accepted by
other experts in the field.' 6 The court did not inquire into the the-
ory's error rater 7
100. See infra Part V for further discussion.
101. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,590 n.8 (1993).
102. 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994).
103. See id. at 1348-49.
104. See id. at 1348.
105. See id. at 1350-51.
106. See id. The expert testimony was held inadmissible. See id. at 1352.
107. See id. at 1350. The reason for this is quite evident from the nature of the
testimony-a highly nonscientific police discipline theory can hardly be tested, nor
can its rate of error be determined.
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Although the court discussed the distinctions between scien-
tific and nonscientific expert testimony,'08 it nevertheless applied
the Daubert factors, which were formulated specifically for scien-
tific expert testimony.1' 9 The court's analysis in Berry raises an im-
portant question regarding the appropriateness of such a literal
application of Daubert to nonscientific theories that are not gen-
erally tested or subjected to peer review."0
B. The Most Restrictive Approach to Daubert
On the other side of the spectrum, several circuit decisions
have expressly declared that Daubert must be limited to scientific
expert testimony."' A few other circuit cases have implicitly fol-




The Second Circuit has consistently limited the scope of
Daubert to scientific testimony."' In Iacobelli Construction, Inc. v.
County of Monroe14 the court held that the test articulated in
Daubert did not apply to the affidavits of a geotechnical or an un-
derground-construction consultant, and that the lower court's
"reliance on Daubert was misplaced.""115 According to the Second
Circuit, the affidavits in that case did not "present the kind of 'junk
science' problem that Daubert meant to address.""' 6 Further, in
108. See id. at 1349-50.
109. See id. at 1350-51.
110. For further discussion see infra Part IV.B.2.
111. See, e.g., Thomas v. Newton Int'l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266, 1270 n.3 (9th Cir.
1994) ("Daubert was clearly confined to the evaluation of scientific expert testi-
mony.").
112. See United States v. Rice, 52 F.3d 843 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. John-
son, 28 F.3d 1487 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332 (10th Cir.
1994).
113. See Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1994)
(refusing to apply the Daubert test to affidavits of a geotechnical consultant and an
underground-construction consultant); Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51
(2d Cir. 1993) (refusing to extend the Daubert test to an expert accountant's testi-
mony); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding the admission
of a DEA agent's testimony regarding methods used in illegal drug operations).
114. 32 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1994).
115. Id. at 25.
116. Id. The court cited its earlier decision in Tamarin, where it held that Daubert
"specifically dealt with the admissibility of scientific evidence" and did not apply to
an expert testimony of an accountant. Id. (quoting Tamarin, 13 F.3d at 53).
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several decisions involving expert testimony on organized crime,
the court implicitly refused to apply Daubert by focusing on the




The Ninth Circuit refused to apply Daubert to the testimony
of an experienced longshore worker regarding the hazard of hav-
ing an uncovered manhole on a vessel. 8 The court stated that
"Daubert was clearly confined to the evaluation of scientific expert
testimony,"".9 explaining that the "[s]pecial concerns" associated
with scientific testimony did not arise when evaluating expert tes-
timony based on specialized knowledge and skill, such as twenty-
nine years of experience on the waterfront.
2 0
The court subsequently reaffirmed this view in an unpublished
opinion upholding the admission of expert testimony on the modus
operandi of drug traffickers.12 1 The court explicitly stated that
Daubert only applied to scientific testimony" and did not displace
earlier decisions dealing with expert testimony based on special-
ized knowledge.'23
3. Tenth Circuit
In Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc.24 the Tenth Circuit
held that Daubert had "little bearing" on expert testimony that
was based not on methodology or technique but on the expert's
experience and training.'25 Compton was a products liability action
against an automobile manufacturer in which the plaintiff's engi-
neering expert testified that the design and roof support structures
117. See United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d 1251, 1263-64 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding
the admission of an FBI agent's testimony regarding the organization and terminol-
ogy of New York crime families); Locascio, 6 F.3d at 936-37 (admitting expert testi-
mony on the structure of organized crime families); United States v. Daccarett, 6
F.3d 37, 58 (2d Cir. 1993) (admitting the testimony of a DEA agent regarding meth-
ods criminals use in drug operations).
118. See Thomas, 42 F.3d at 1269-70.
119. Id. at 1270 n.3.
120. See id.
121. See United States v. Arevalo-Gamboa, No. 94-50236, 1995 WL 623746, at *2
(9th Cir. Oct. 24, 1995).
122- See id.
123. See id.
124. 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 611 (1996).
125. See id. at 1519.
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in the vehicle were defective because they permitted excessive
roof crush.1 26 The court held that because the expert testimony was
not based on any particular methodology but on "general engi-
neering principles and [the expert's] twenty-two years of experi-
ence as an automotive engineer," the court did not need to per-
form the Daubert inquiry into the reliability of the expert's
methods. 27 The testimony was admissible as long as the expert
testified on matters "within the reasonable confines of his subject
area.""- And even though the witness had no expertise in design-
ing automobile roofs, and the lower court admittedly had a low
opinion of his "credibility and of the validity of his opinions," the
court affirmed the admission of his testimony based on the findings
that the expert had sufficient qualifications and his testimony was
"facially helpful and relevant." 9
In this court's view the Daubert test did not change the tradi-
tional analysis under Rule 702, but instead set out additional fac-
tors the trial judge must consider if expert testimony is based on
novel or controversial methodologies and techniques."' The court
noted that "the weight and credibility of [the expert] testimony
were issues for the jury.
13'
The Compton decision is the latest in a series of post-Daubert
Tenth Circuit opinions in which the court has consistently applied
traditional Rule 702 analysis to nonscientific expert testimony, fo-
cusing solely on the issues of relevancy, the expert's qualifications,
and the helpfulness of the testimony to the jury.32 The court did
not analyze the reliability of the expert's methods. 33
United States v. Muldrow3 is a case of particular interest be-
cause it dealt with the issue of admissibility of both scientific and
126. See id. at 1516.
127. Id. at 1519.
128. Id. at 1520 (citation omitted).
129. Id at 1519-20.
130. See id
131. Id. at 1520.
132. See, e.g., United States v. Rice, 52 F.3d 843, 846-47 (10th Cir. 1995)
(excluding the testimony by a tax attorney because it was speculative and irrelevant
to the question before the jury); United States v. Markum, 4 F.3d 891, 895-96 (10th
Cir. 1993) (admitting a fire chiefs testimony regarding the cause of fire after consid-
ering his twenty-nine years of experience in the field and the helpfulness of his spe-
cialized knowledge to the jury).
133. See Rice, 52 F.3d at 846-47; Markum, 4 F.3d at 895-96.
134. 19 F.3d 1332 (10th Cir. 1994).
April 1997] 1393
1394 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
nonscientific expert testimony.135 The court upheld the admission
of a veteran police officer's nonscientific expert testimony on the
question of whether 4.4 kilograms of cocaine was an amount con-
sistent with distribution rather than personal use.136 It reasoned
that the expert's specialized knowledge of drug trafficking was
needed to assist the jury in assessing the significance of the large
amount of cocaine. 3 The admissibility of the expert testimony
was discussed solely in terms of its helpfulness to the jury, and the
court relied exclusively on its pre-Daubert cases."' The court
made no references to Daubert in the part of the opinion dealing
with the nonscientific expert testimony.139 In contrast, the scien-
tific testimony of a forensic chemist identifying the substance as
cocaine was analyzed under Daubert's four-prong test. 40 The dif-
ference in the analysis of the two types of expert testimony clearly
indicates that the Tenth Circuit views the scope of Daubert as
strictly limited to scientific testimony.
C. Analyzing Nonscientific Testimony in Light of Daubert's
Reliability Requirement
The following are cases from circuit courts that have used
Daubert's guidance to ensure the reliability of all expert testimony
presented at trial. But unlike the Sixth Circuit's decision in Berry
v. City of Detroit,41 these courts have not tried to apply literally
Daubert's four-part test to nonscientific testimony. They have
analyzed the reliability of the expert's methodology by focusing on
the matters appropriate for the particular expertise in question.
1. First Circuit
The First Circuit has been screening nonscientific expert tes-
timony for reliability without applying Daubert's science-oriented
factors in nonscientific fields such as the evaluation of rare coins
142
and the establishment of usage of trade in commercial transac-
135. See id. at 1337-38.




140. See id. at 1337.
141. 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994). For a discussion of the Berry decision, see supra
Part III.A.
142. See United States v. Kayne, 90 F.3d 7, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1996).
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tions.'4' In United States v. Kayne'44 the court examined the opin-
ions of coin evaluation experts 45 and found them sufficiently reli-
able-"the chains of custody of the coins were carefully estab-
lished, the experts' methods were explained, and the appraisals
were reasonably current."'1 In Den Norske Bank AS v. First Na-
tional Bank of Boston 47 the court determined the reliability of a
banker's expert testimony by examining how the expert reached
his conclusion regarding "usage of trade., 141 It held the testimony
admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert because, during his forty-
year banking career, the expert had become very familiar with the
commercial agreements in question and had observed firsthand the
well-established industry custom and practice.
149
2. Third Circuit
In the first post-Daubert Third Circuit ruling on the admissi-
bility of nonscientific evidence, 151 the court evaluated economists'
expert testimony in an antitrust action.'5' Although the court did
not cite the then recent decision in Daubert,'52 it affirmed the ad-
mission of the testimony only after examining the analysis used by
the economists and the accuracy of the data upon which they re-
lied.'53
143. See Den Norske Bank AS v. First Nat'l Bank, 75 F.3d 49, 56-59 (1st Cir.
1996).
144. 90 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1996).
145. See id. at 11-12. The defendant in Kayne was convicted of mail fraud for
selling coins that were of substantially lower quality and value than he had repre-
sented to his customers. See id at 10.
146. Id. at 12.
147. 75 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 1996).
148. Id. at 58. The case involved a dispute between two banks over the defendant
bank's partial forgiveness of a loan after a borrower's default. See id. at 51. On ap-
peal the plaintiff bank challenged the admission of defendant bank's expert evidence
on banking industry practices. See id. at 57.
149. See id. at 58.
150. See Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d
1224 (3d Cir. 1993). This case was decided less than a month after the Daubert deci-
sion.
151. See id. at 1236-38. A supermarket brought an action against fat-and-bone
rendering companies for conspiracy to restrain competition in violation of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act. See id. at 1228. Plaintiffs proffered the expert testimony of two
economists regarding the pricing patterns that suggested anticompetitive behavior.
See id. at 1236-37.
152. See it at 1238.
153. See id. The court was satisfied with the reliability of the economists' multiple
regression analysis and concluded that there was nothing in the record showing flaws
in their data. See id.
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In Habecker v. Clark Equipment Co.1- a later decision, the
court explicitly relied on Daubert in evaluating the reliability of
testimony by an accident reconstruction expert in a products liabil-
ity action.'5 In affirming the exclusion of the expert testimony, the
court did not inquire into the testability, error rate, peer review, or
general acceptance of the experiment conducted by the expert."6
However, it did state that Daubert required a preliminary assess-
ment of the validity of the expert's methodology.1 5 The court
analyzed the accident simulation experiment and found it unreli-
able.
158
In United States v. Velasquez"' the court addressed the ques-
tion of whether it was "appropriate to apply the Daubert tests for
scientific expert testimony to the field of handwriting analysis. ' '10°
After briefly discussing how other federal courts had dealt with the
admissibility of nonscientific expert testimony,61 the court con-
cluded that the "[Daubert] tests are helpful to assist [the court] in
[its] consideration of the expertise in question."' 62 The court thor-
oughly analyzed the methodology underlying handwriting analysis
and found it to be reliable.13
154. 36 F.3d 278 (3d Cir. 1994).
155. See id. at 289-90. The representatives of a forklift operator who was killed by
an overturned forklift brought an action against the forklift manufacturer and its les-
sor. See id. at 280. At trial the court refused to admit the testimony of the plaintiff's
expert witness who had attempted to simulate the accident. See id. at 289.
156. These are the four factors for determining "scientific knowledge" as articu-
lated by the Daubert court. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
157. See Habecker, 36 F.3d at 290.
158. See id. The court found that the expert did not properly replicate the height
of the forklift or its movement. See id.
159. 64 F.3d 844 (3d Cir. 1995).
160. Id. at 850.
161. The court cited two Second Circuit decisions which found the Daubert test to
be "too stringent to employ in considering whether to admit the expert testimony of
accountants and construction experts." Id. (discussing lacobelli Constr., Inc. v.
County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19,25 (2d Cir. 1994); Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13
F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1993)). The Velasquez court also cited United States v.
Starzecpyzel, in which the trial judge found the Daubert factors inapplicable to the
evaluation of inadmissibility of expert testimony by a forensic document examiner.
See id. (citing United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1040-41 (S.D.N.Y.
1995)).
162- Id.
163. See id. at 850-52.
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3. Fifth Circuit,
In Marcel v. Placid Oil Co.'64 the Fifth Circuit examined the
admissibility of testimony by an expert economist on the worklife
expectancy of an oilfield worker. 65 The court relied on Daubert in
evaluating the reliability of the expert's testimony.'6 It affirmed
the exclusion of the testimony, holding that the analysis upon
which it was based lacked important data which rendered the tes-
timony either "not sufficiently reliable" or unfairly prejudicial to
the other party.167
Similarly, in Pedraza v. Jones'6 the court affirmed a lower
court's refusal to admit an affidavit by a long-term drug addict de-
scribing the effects of heroin withdrawal.' 69 The court neither did a
detailed analysis nor applied the Daubert factors. It merely re-
viewed the testimony for "indicia of reliability" and rejected the
evidence after finding that the reliability was lacking.'70
The court found the requisite indicia of reliability in United
States v. 14.38 Acres of Land,7' which involved expert testimony
by a civil engineer and a real estate appraiser in an eminent do-
main action.' 2 The lower court rejected the expert testimony on
anticipated damages to the property as "speculative."'73 The Fifth
Circuit recognized that under Daubert a court had a gatekeeping
duty to analyze the basis for an expert's conclusions and the meth-
ods employed174 but found the trial judge's approach to be "too
stringent." The court held that the testimony by the civil engi-
neer was sufficiently reliable because the expert had reached his
conclusion about the likelihood of flooding on the property after
164. 11 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 1994).
165. See id. at 567-68. The worker sued an offshore platform operator for injuries
sustained in a slip-and-fall accident. See id. at 565. The defendant sought to intro-
duce expert evidence to show that oilfield workers have a shorter than average
worklife expectancy. See id. at 567.
166. See id. at 567-68.
167. Id. at 568.
168. 71 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1995).
169. See id. at 197. The witness was allegedly an expert due to his thirty years of
experience with heroin addiction. See id.
170. Id.
171. 80 F.3d 1074 (5th Cir. 1996).
172. See id at 1075-76. A property owner in an eminent domain action tried to
introduce expert testimony on the likelihood of flooding to establish "anticipated
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reviewing maps, photographs, and data, and by inspecting the
property.176 The court was also satisfied with the methods used by
the real estate appraiser who had inspected the property because
he had looked at comparable sales and had discussed the property
with other appraisers, brokers, and lenders. 7
4. Sixth Circuit
Despite the application of the four Daubert factors in Berry v.
City of Detroit,78 the Sixth Circuit moved away from a literal ap-
proach to Daubert in Cook v. American Steamship Co. 179 In Cook
a seaman sued his employer for negligence based on the injury he
suffered when the line that was supporting him in a boatswain's
chair broke, tossing him to the dock.r80 The defendant's expert on
rope testing testified that the line had parted because it had been
burned.1
8 1
The Cook court reaffirmed the principle in Berry' that prob-
lems of evidentiary reliability are as prominent for nonscientific as
for scientific expert testimony.'8 And although Daubert specifi-
cally requires a court to determine whether expert methodology is
scientifically valid, "[a] comparable duty is imposed upon the trial
court when the subject of the proposed opinion testimony is not
'scientific' knowledge, but 'technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge.""m' But unlike its analysis in Berry, 5 the court's analysis in
Cook did not literally app ly the Daubert factors to the testimony of
the rope testing expert.
The court, however, excluded the expert's testimony after
finding that it was not based on any testing and that the witness
had failed to "call upon any 'scientific, technical, or other special-
ized knowledge' that would have given him a valid basis upon
which to form his opinion."' 7 The court expressed concern about
176. See id. at 1079.
177. See id.
178. 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994). For a discussion of the Berry case, see
supra Part III.A.
179. 53 F.3d 733 (6th Cir. 1995).
180. See id. at 736.
181. See id. at 739.
182. See Berry, 25 F.3d at 1349.
183. See Cook, 53 F.3d at 738.
184. Id.
185. See Berry, 25 F.3d at 1350-51.
186. See Cook, 53 F.3d at 738-40.
187. Id. at 740.
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allowing the jury to hear such an unsubstantiated opinion,
"adorned as it was in the dress of scientific or technical expertise
and fortified by the court's... calling it 'expert opinion."" 8, The
court concluded that this was precisely the type of testimony the
Supreme Court in Daubert had instructed federal courts to screen
out as part of their gatekeeping function.189
5. District of Columbia Circuit
In a wrongful death action, the District of Columbia Circuit
ruled on the admissibility of nonscientific expert testimony by an
economist, who had testified on the potential income and invest-
ment profits of a helicopter crash victim.'1 ' After examining the
methods and assumptions upon which the expert had formed his
opinion, the court concluded that it "'was based solely on guess-
work, speculation, and conjecture"""' and that the lower court had
erred in allowing that opinion to be presented at trial.'92 The court
stated that Daubert's requirement of "'regulation of the subjects
and theories about which an expert may testify"" 93 reinforced the
court's intent not to allow the jury to hear unreliable testimony. It
refused to use the typical judicial excuse that the jury will allot the
opinion "'the weight it deserves."" 4 The court emphasized that
under Daubert the word "knowledge" in Rule 702 "'connotes
more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation," '95 and
concluded that the expert testimony in this case failed to satisfy
this standard.'96
D. Inconsistent Application of Daubert" Sometimes It Applies,
Sometimes It Does Not
Inconsistent application of Daubert to nonscientific expert
testimony has emerged not just between the circuits but also
within several circuits. In particular, the Seventh Circuit has ex-
188. Id. at 739.
189. See id.
190. See Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 567-70 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
191. Id. at 568 (quoting Appellant's Brief at 45).
192. See id.
193. Id. at 570 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589).
194. Id. at 569 (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230,
1233 (5th Cir. 1986)).
195. Id. at 570 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590).
196. See id.
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pressly stated that Daubert applies to all types of expert testimony
but, meanwhile, has not applied Daubert in several cases.
1. Seventh Circuit
In several early post-Daubert opinions, the Seventh Circuit
unequivocally stated that courts must always evaluate an expert's
methodology to ascertain the validity of the expert's testimony. 197
In a more recent case, Roback v. V.LP. Transportation Inc.,9" the
court analyzed an engineering expert's methodology in a personal
injury case.'9 The lower court excluded the testimony on the
grounds that it lacked a scientific basis and had not been subjected
to meaningful peer review.2 11 The Seventh Circuit rejected such a
literal approach to DaubertY It analyzed the expert's technique-
a computerized data acquisition system-and found that it con-
sisted of standard components.m The court also considered the
expert's data and noted that it was subject to examination and in-
dependent verification.23 Accordingly, it held that the expert tes-
timony was sufficiently reliable to qualify for admission under
Rule 702. 2 4
In at least two other opinions, however, the court failed to ex-
tend Daubert's reliability inquiry to nonscientific expert testi-
mony,2° and in one of those cases it explicitly stated that Daubert
had no direct relevance to the question of admissibility of such
testimony.2° In United States v. Williams2i' the court affirmed the
197. See, e.g., Deimer v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc., 58 F.3d 341, 343-45 (7th
Cir. 1995) (affirming the exclusion of expert testimony on allegedly negligent prod-
uct design because the expert did not have the requisite expertise in the area and
failed to support his conclusions with a reliable methodology); Frymire-Brinati v.
KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 186-87 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding inadmissible expert
testimony by an accountant who used only historical, as opposed to potential, cash
flows in the discounted cash flow analysis).
198. 90 F.3d 1207 (7th Cir. 1996).
199. See id. at 1214-16. The motorists sued a truck driver and a moving company
for injuries sustained when the truck rear-ended their vehicle. See id. at 1209. The
defense expert sought to testify on the measurements of an automobile's perform-
ance taken by the expert's self-designed equipment. See id. at 1214.
200. See id. at 1215.
201. See id.
202. See id at 1216.
203. See id.
204. See id
205. See United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1441-42 (7th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753,757-58 (7th Cir. 1996).
206. See Sinclair, 74 F.3d at 757.
207. 81 F.3d 1434 (7th Cir. 1996).
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admission of testimony by a witness familiar with the code of the
El Rukns street gang.28 The court's analysis focused on whether a
criminal was qualified to testify as an expert witness.m It per-
formed a traditional Rule 702 analysis, addressing only the wit-
ness's qualifications and the helpfulness of the testimony to the
jury.210
The court went further in United States v. Sinclai" when it
stated that Daubert did not create a special test for determining
the admissibility of all expert testimony but only a method for
evaluating the reliability of scientific witnesses.212 Sinclair involved
the testimony of a legal expert .2 " According to the Sinclair court,
Daubert had "no direct relevance to questions about the admissi-
bility of testimony by a witness who claims legal expertise., 214 This
language stands in contrast to the court's earlier decisions in
Deimer v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Products, Inc. and Frymire-Brinati
v. KPMG Peat Marwick, where it emphasized the importance of




The Eighth Circuit also lacks consistency in its approach to
nonscientific expert testimony. ,Jn United States v. Johnson21 6 it fo-
cused on the helpfulness component of Rule 702 in admitting ex-
pert testimony on drug trafficking. 7 The witness in that case pos-
sessed specialized knowledge stemming from his extensive
personal experience in the drug business.2 ' The court stated that
in determining the issue of admissibility, the relevant inquiry was
whether expert testimony would be "helpful" to the jury.' It cited
208. See id. at 1441.
209. See id The court concluded that the witness was qualified to testify because
"the biggest experts on crime are, often, criminals." Id.
210. See id. The court distinguished Daubert by saying that one does not need to
be a scientist or use scientific methodology in order to possess specialized knowledge
about criminal conduct. See id. at 1442.
211. 74 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 1996).
212. See id. at 757.
213. See id
214. Id
215. See Deimer, 58 F.3d at 344; Frymire-Brinati, 2 F.3d at 186-87.
216. 28 F.3d 1487 (8th Cir. 1994).
217. See id. at 1497.
218. See id. at 1496-97.
219. See id.
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Daubert for both reliability and relevance requirements, yet it held
that testimony was admissible merely because it was helpful2 0
The reliability of the testimony was not examined.
The court took a different approach in Ventura v. Titan
Sports,2 which involved a "reliability-based challenge" m to the
testimony of the plaintiff's damages expert22 The court did not
just focus on whether the testimony was "helpful to the jury," as it
did in Johnson, but also addressed the reliability of the testi-
mony.m The court held that the expert's testimony was reliable
because the expert had employed methods similar to the other
party's experts and had surveyed thousands of relevant documents
in reaching his conclusions.m
In summary, the circuit courts have adopted inconsistent ap-
proaches to the admissibility of nonscientific expert testimony in
the wake of the Supreme Court decision in Daubert. The Second,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have refused to extend Daubert to non-
scientific expert testimony.26 The First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and
District of Columbia Circuits have extended Daubert's reliability
requirement to nonscientific expert testimony,m and in one case,
the Sixth Circuit even applied Daubert's four-part test.m The Sev-
enth and Eighth circuits have each been inconsistent-performing
an inquiry into the reliabilitl of nonscientific expert testimony in
some cases but not in others.
IV. THE SCOPE OF THE DAUBERT OPINION
Prior to discussing the application of Daubert's reliability re-
quirement to nonscientific expert testimony, several important
threshold issues must be addressed. These are the questions re-
garding the appropriate scope of Daubert that Chief Justice
220. See id.
221. 65 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 1995).
222. Id. at 733.
223. In Ventura a wrestler brought an action against a wrestling organization for
fraud, misappropriation of publicity rights, and quantum meruit. See id. at 728. The
trial court admitted expert testimony as to the market rate of royalties for licensing
intellectual property. See id.
224. See id. at 734.
225. See id.
226. See supra Part III.B.
227. See supra Part III.C.
228. See supra Part III.A.
229. See supra Part III.D.
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Rehnquist raised in his dissenting opinion.23 While articulating
the test for admissibility of scientific expert testimony, the Daubert
majority left unclear which bodies of knowledge are "scientific."
Section A fills in this gap by suggesting the disciplines that the
courts should treat as "scientific" for the purposes of the Daubert
analysis. The Court also did not make it clear whether Daubert's
general principles and its four factors should apply to nonscientific
testimony. Section B presents an analysis of this issue and con-
cludes that Daubert's reliability principles ought to be extended to
nonscientific testimony, but the four-factor test should be limited
to the analysis of scientific evidence.
A. What is Science? Distinguishing Scientific Expert Testimony
from Other Types of Expert Testimony in Rule 702
The Supreme Court in Daubert instructed trial judges to en-
sure the reliability of all scientific expert testimony, but it did not
specify which expert evidence is "scientific" and thus subject to
Daubert's four-prong analysis3' Several legal commentators have
discussed the difficulty of differentiating "science" from the other
types of expert testimony mentioned in Rule 702-especially
technical expert testimony-and how, in their view, Daubert has
not given the courts sufficient guidance on the matterf 2
Typical of many words, "science" has a variety of definitions,
depending on the dictionary one consults. According to the Ran-
dom House Dictionary of the English Language, science is "a
branch of knowledge or study dealing with a body of facts or truths
systematically arranged and showing the operation of general
laws. '' 233 The Oxford American Dictionary defines science as "a
230. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600 (1993)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a discussion of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion, see supra Part II.C.
231. See Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New
Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEx. L. REv. 715, 751 (1994) ("If lawyers and
judges hope to apply the new Daubert test rationally, they will have to learn what
distinguishes science from other forms of knowledge-what it is that makes science
scientific.").
232. See Nahas, supra note 51, at 127; Diana K. Sheiness, Note, Out of the Twilight
Zone: The Implications of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 69 WASH.
L. REv. 481, 491 (1994); Timothy B. Dyk & Gregory A. Castanias, Daubert Doesn't
End Debate on Experts, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2, 1993, at 20 ("[W]ho is a scientist? A po-
litical scientist? A 'human factors expert'?").
233. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1279 (2d ed.
1983) [hereinafter RANDOM HOUSE].
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branch of knowledge requiring systematic study and method."
Unfortunately, neither of these definitions provides a key to de-
termining whether the evidence facing a trial judge is scientific
testimony of the kind the Daubert Court had in mind.
The definition of the word "technical" in Rule 702 is just as
difficult to ascertain. The Random House Dictionary of the Eng-
lish Language defines technical as "pertaining to an art, science, or
the like," or "characteristic of a particular art, science, profession,
trade, etc."235  Other dictionaries offer slightly differing defini-
tions.236 But one conclusion can be drawn-dictionary definitions
of "scientific" and "technical" significantly overlap and neither
definition provides much guidance for the appropriate use of these
words in Rule 702.
As the definitions offer little practical help, the next logical
source for guidance is the Daubert opinion itself. One must look
to the Court's decision to ascertain what disciplines the Justices
had in mind when they articulated the famous four-prong test. In
fact, Daubert's brief discussion on the philosophy of science and
the portion of the opinion containing the four factors offer valu-
able clues.
The Daubert court seemed to embrace the concept of
"Newtonian science," where a scientist forms a hypothesis and
then engages in experimentation or observation to validate it.237
Newton used experiments to derive and test the laws of mechan-
ics.23 Reliance on such experimental methodology is sometimes
referred to as "Newtonian science."23' 9 According to the Court, the
experimental methodology is "what distinguishes science from
other fields of human inquiry."24 It stated that a theory derives its
scientific status from "its falsifiability, or refutability, or testabil-
ity."241
With this in mind, the Daubert court articulated four factors
234. OXFORD AMERICAN DICrIONARY 605 (1980) [hereinafter OXFORD].
235. RANDOM HOUSE, supra note 233, at 1458.
236. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1463 (6th ed. 1990) (technical means
"[b]elonging or peculiar to an art or profession"; "'words of art"'); OXFORD, supra
note 234, at 704 (defining technical as "of the mechanical arts and applied sciences,.
of a particular subject or craft").
237. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 2276; Kesan, supra note 18, at 2006.
238. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 2276.
239. See id. at 2276-77.




aimed at determining the validity of scientific expert testimony.
The factors reflect the way in which the modem scientific com-
munity analyzes the validity of scientific theories.242 First, the
theories are tested.243 If a theory cannot be tested, it is not scien-
tific.2" The system of peer review and publication-the second
factor-also forms an important component of "good science.
245
After scientists conduct experiments and formulate a scientific
theory, they must submit the theory "to the scrutiny of the scien-
tific community." 24- Only after experts in that field review the the-
ory can the scientific community feel assured that it is good sci-
ence. Likewise, the error rate-Daubert's third factor2 47 -is a
valuable indicator used by scientists to determine the validity of a
particular theory. In other words, to determine the reliability of
any scientific expert testimony, Daubert instructs trial judges to
use the same methods employed by members of the scientific
community in determining the validity of scientific theories.
It is quite clear from this part of the decision what type of tes-
timony constitutes Daubert's science. It is experimental Newto-
nian science that can be tested, the error rate of which can be as-
certained, which is subject to peer review by fellow scientists, and
which is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.
Any discipline that cannot be reasonably subjected to this type of
analysis is not science within the meaning of Rule 702.
B. Should Daubert Be Extended to Nonscientific Expert
Testimony?
The language of Daubert clearly sets scientific expert testi-
mony apart from all other forms of expert testimony.24" The Court
first focused on the words "scientific knowledge" in Rule 702 as
the textual justification for judicial scrutiny of scientific expert tes-
timony.249 The Court then specifically noted that, although Rule
702 also applies to other types of expert testimony, the Court's
242. See id. at 593-94.
243. See id. at 593.
244. See id. Since Newtonian science relies on experimental methodology, the
validity of scientific theory is determined through testing. See Imwinkelried, supra
note 10, at 2276-77.
245. See id. at 593-94.
246. Id. at 593.
247. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
248. See id. at 589-90.
249. See id. at 590-91.
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opinion was "limited to the scientific context."2 0 Further, as dis-
cussed above, Daubert's four-part test appears to have been aimed
at determining the reliability of Newtonian scientific testimony-
testimony based on experimental methodology, tested and sub-
jected to peer review through publication in scientific journals. 
2 1
But Daubert's discussion of the reliability of expert testimony
has implications beyond scientific expert testimony. In fact, most
circuit courts have interpreted it broadly to impose on judges a
gatekeeping role with regard to all types of expert testimony prof-
fered at trial.2 2 The following sections explore why courts should
apply Daubert's reliability requirement to all types of expert testi-
mony but limit its four-part test to testimony based on Newtonian
science.
1. Daubert's reliability principles
While there has been growing concern over the proliferation
of "junk science" in the courtroom,53 "the complaints about the
reliability of nonscientific expert testimony have been fewer and
less vehement." 25 Some circuit courts have refused to extend
Daubert to nonscientific expert evidence, stating that Daubert
dealt with the special problems associated with "junk science,"
which do not arise in the context of nonscientific expert testi-
mony.25 These courts have performed a traditional Rule 702
analysis focusing on the qualifications of the expert witness and
the helpfulness of the testimony to the jury.2 6
Other courts, such as the Seventh Circuit, imply that
Daubert's requirement of judicial gatekeeping is unnecessary
where expert testimony is not technical or complex in nature. This
250. lI at 590 n.8.
251. See supra Part IV.A.
252. See cases discussed supra Part III.C.
253. See McCarthy, supra note 60, at 350 n.1 (discussing sharp criticism by many
courts and commentators of the prevalent practice of admitting unreliable expert
evidence).
254. See, Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 2279.
255. See, e.g., Thomas v. Newton Int'l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266, 1270 n.3 (9th Cir.
1994) ("Special concerns arise when evaluating the proffer of scientific testimony
that do not arise when evaluating the type of expert testimony offered here."); Iaco-
belli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
the affidavits by technical consultants did not "present the kind of 'junk science'
problem that Daubert meant to address").
256. See cases discussed supra Part III.B. For additional discussion of the tradi-
tional analysis of nonscientific expert evidence under Rule 702, see Part II.A.
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can be inferred from the Seventh Circuit's inconsistent application
of Daubert to different types of nonscientific expert testimony. In
the earlier post-Daubert cases, the court applied Daubert's reliabil-
ity analysis to expert testimony by an accountant 5 and by a prod-
uct design expert.28  In both cases the court evaluated expert
methodology that was rather technical or esoteric. In one case, for
example, the court examined the validity of a discounted cash flow
analysis performed by an accounting expert.29 But in several later
cases, the Seventh Circuit held that Daubert did not apply to tes-
timony by an expert on a criminal code2 ° or by a legal expert.21 It
appears that where expert testimony is not technical in nature-no
data to analyze, no models to consider, no calculations to exam-
ine-the court reverts to the traditional approach to Rule 702 that
focuses on an expert's qualifications and relies on the jurors to as-
sign the testimony the appropriate "weight" based on its credibil-
ity.
62
These courts, however, have been too hasty in abandoning
their gatekeeping duties where nonscientific evidence is con-
cerned. Even when expert evidence is not particularly complex or
esoteric in nature, the specialized knowledge possessed by the ex-
pert will still fall outside the scope of an average juror's knowledge
or experience. This concept is the basis of the "helpfulness" prong
of Rule 702, which allows opinion testimony by an expert only if it
can "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence." The
advisory committee note to Rule 702 suggests that such expert
opinion should be permitted only if "the untrained layman would
[not] be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possi-
ble degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those
having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the
dispute." Therefore, the jurors are expected to assign appropri-
ate weight to expert testimony, which by definition falls outside
257. See Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183,186 (7th Cir. 1993).
258. See Deimer v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc., 58 F.3d 341, 343 (7th Cir.
1995).
259. See Frymire-Brinati, 2 F.3d at 186.
260. See United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434,1441 (7th Cir. 1996).
261. See United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1996).
262. For a discussion on the jury's role under the traditional approach, see Strong,
supra note 10, at 363-64.
263. FED. R. EVID. 702.
264. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note (quoting Mason Ladd, Expert
Testimony, 5 VAND. L. Ray. 414,418 (1952)).
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their knowledge or expertise. This paradox was eloquently de-
scribed by Judge Learned Hand:
The whole object of the expert is to tell the jury, not facts
... but general truths derived from his specialized experi-
ence. But how can the jury judge between two statements
each founded upon an experience confessedly foreign in
kind to their own? It is just because they are incompetent
for such a task that the expert is necessary at all.265
One must not assume that when an expert does not employ
complicated formulas, the jury will necessarily find it easier to as-
certain the reliability of such testimony. The jury may be as much
at a loss when faced with the testimony on such specialized sub-
jects as banking, accounting, classical music, legal standards of
care, or medieval history, as when evaluating DNA evidence. Be-
cause expert testimony is there to educate jurors on subjects about
which they do not possess sufficient knowledge, jurors might be
unwilling or simply unable to scrutinize the expert's reliability, and
may treat the expert's opinion with unquestioning deference.
Thus, the court's gatekeeping role is arguably just as impor-
tant where nonscientific testimony is concerned. Courts and
commentators have voiced strong doubts about the trustworthiness
of nonscientific experts, whose testimony can be easily purchased
"in virtually every field of science and technology. ' '26 To mitigate
the danger of undue influence of this testimony on the jury, judges
must carefully screen the validity of the testimony before admit-
ting it in court.
The judge does not actively perform this gatekeeping role un-
der the traditional approach to Rule 702.269 The reliability of the
testimony is "conveniently subsumed under the question of the
265. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REv. 40,54 (1902).
266. See 29 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 6264, at 182-83 (1997).
267. See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that it
appears obvious that problems of admissibility of expert testimony "are exacerbated
when courts must deal with the even more elusive concept of non-scientific testi-
mony"); Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 2279 (stating that "the trustworthiness of
nonscientific expert testimony is every bit as suspect as the reliability of scientific
evidence").
268. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 266, at 183.
269. See Strong, supra note 10, at 363-64 (discussing the roles of a judge and a jury
under the traditional approach).
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qualification of the expert witness." 27 Courts find it easier to re-
view the witnesses' educational backgrounds and experiences than
the methodology they used in reaching their conclusions.27 As to
methodology, courts tend to give considerable weight to experts'
assurances that the data on which they based their propositions is
sufficiently accurate.
The obvious problem with this approach is that by focusing on
the expert's qualifications, the court is expected to infer-or ac-
cept the expert's assurances-that the testimony is based on reli-
able methodology. It may be reasonable to assume that if the ex-
perts have relevant training and previous experiences in the
subject matter, they should be able to reach sound conclusions
with regard to the present case. But it would be more effective if
the court examined directly the expert's data and reasoning, and
then drew its own conclusions regarding their soundness.
For instance, if an accountant wished to testify as to whether
financial statements were fraudulent, under the traditional ap-
proach the court would consider the accountant's education,
training, and whether prior audits conducted by the accountant are
similar to the one in question. But the court would not inquire
into the validity of the data the expert accountant used or the
soundness of the accountant's reasoning. Similarly, when faced
with the proffer of legal expert testimony regarding an attorney's
standard of care, the traditional approach would require an inquiry
only into the attorney's education and experience in this area of
the law. The court would not ask how the expert reached the con-
clusion about the appropriate standard of care. The presumption
is that, given the showing of required expertise, the court can trust
the expert's conclusions. That trust, however, may be unwar-
ranted. A court must not assume that because an attorney or an
accountant has many years of relevant experience in a particular
area, that witness would not manipulate the testimony to please a
paying client. In the age of "experts for hire," it is not inconceiv-
able for a party to "purchase" persons with impressive credentials
to say what the party wants them to say.273
270. Id at363.
271. See id. at 363-64.
272. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 2281.
273. See L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back to the Future, 29 U.
RICH. L. REv. 1389, 1453 (1995) ("Rule 702's 'liberal thrust' is inconsistent with a
paid expert working as an advocate to persuade the jury of the client's position. The
Rules should be skeptical of experts, not trusting and accepting.").
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The Tenth Circuit's analysis in Compton v. Subaru of Amer-
ica, Inc.,24 albeit atypical, is a good example of the loophole for
"junk" expert evidence that the traditional approach helps create.
In Compton a passenger injured in a rollover accident prevailed in
a products liability action against the automobile manufacturer
and the distributor2 5 On appeal, the defendants argued that the
district court failed in its gatekeeping duties and erroneously ad-
mitted the testimony of the plaintiff's design expert.2 6 The Tenth
Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in al-
lowing an engineer to testify as to whether the roof design and the
support system of the automobile were defective. 2V Although the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, it also held that
the lower court erred in performing the Daubert analysis: where
expert testimony is not based on any particular methodology or
technique, but instead on general engineering principles and the
expert's twenty years of engineering experience, the Daubert in-
quiry is not required.2 8
The Compton decision seems to turn Daubert on its head. In-
stead of proving the soundness of the methodology, an expert can
get around the Daubert inquiry by saying that no methodology was
used at all. The Daubert Court limited its holding to scientific
knowledge, but it does not mean that other types of specialized
knowledge need not be grounded in sound methodology. As a
general principle, it is illogical to suggest that some experts do not
use any methodology. Experts arrive at their conclusions through
methodology. If there is no methodology, then the expert's opin-
ion is necessarily speculative and, thus, inadmissible.Y9
The product-design testimony in Compton is a classic example
of expert evidence based on engineering methodology. Several
other courts faced with this type of evidence have exhibited a great
deal of caution in admitting it and have vigilantly scrutinized both
the data and the methodology of the experts21 The engineering
274. 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 611 (1996).
275. See id. at 1515.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 1520.
278. See id. at 1519-20.
279. See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 266, at 225-27 & n.45.
280. See Compton, 82 F.3d at 1516 (expert evidence based on inspection of the
vehicle and comparison of the measurements); see also Habecker v. Clark Equip.
Co., 36 F.3d 278, 290 (3d Cir. 1994) (expert evidence based on accident simulation).
281. See, e.g., Deimer v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc., 58 F.3d 341, 344-45 (7th
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expert in Compton did use various methods to reach his conclusion
about the automobile's defective design.m He inspected the acci-
dent vehicle and an identical undamaged car.m He compared the
headroom measurements in the accident vehicle with measure-
ments compiled from hundreds of other accident vehicles that he
had examined during his career.24 Based on those observations
and on six technical and safety publications, the expert proposed
roof crash and headroom requirements. 5 There appeared to have
been abundant data and methodology for the Compton court to
evaluate, which puts in doubt the court's finding that the expert's
testimony "was not based on any particular methodology or tech-
nique." But the court found that because the testimony was
based on "general engineering principles and concepts," no
Daubert scrutiny was required.287 The task of evaluating the
credibility of this engineering testimony was left to the jury.
The Compton case creates a loophole that is hard to ignore.
The less support an expert offers in the form of a particular
method or technique, the less chance that Daubert will apply. And
without Daubert's scrutiny for reliability, all an expert has to show
is proper qualifications.
That is why Daubert's methodology-oriented approach is su-
perior to the traditional approach in ensuring that only reliable
expert evidence is presented at trial. The court's active gatekeep-
ing role relieves the jury from the arduous task of weighing the
credibility of highly specialized expert evidence. At the same
time, Daubert's emphasis on the reliability of the methodology
forces expert witnesses to substantiate their conclusions with
something more than just credentials. Nothing in the language of
the Daubert opinion suggests that the Court intended the rele-
vance and reliability requirements to be limited to scientific testi-
mony. Daubert's principles of ensuring the reliability of expert
testimony are highly pertinent to nonscientific testimony and
Cir. 1995) (affirming the exclusion of the testimony by a product design expert be-
cause "the witness did not conduct any studies or analysis to substantiate his opin-
ion"); Habecker, 36 F.3d at 289-90 (holding inadmissible expert testimony by an ac-
cident reconstructor because of the significant flaws in the accident simulation
experiment).
282. See Compton, 82 F.3d at 1516-17.
283. See id. at 1516.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 1516-17.
286. Id. at 1519.
287. Id. at 1520.
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should be applied by all federal courts.
2. Daubert's four-part test
While Daubert's reliability principles are applicable to all
types of expert evidence, the same cannot be said for the four-part
test. These four nonexclusive factors were designed to assess the
validity of scientific theories that undergo extensive experimental
testing, peer review by fellow scientists, and publication in scien-
tific journals.m Because the Daubert test was formulated for New-
tonian science, it can only be applied to these disciplines2 9 When
faced with the proffer of nonscientific expert testimony, courts
must examine factors more appropriate to the nonscientific exper-
tise in question.2 °
One need only observe the results of a trial court's attempt to
literally apply the Daubert test to a nonscientific expert to be fully
assured of the need for a different analysis of nonscientific evi-
dence. In Berry v. City of Detroi 1 the Sixth Circuit applied the
Daubert factors to the very non-Newtonian "science" of police
discipline. 29 In Berry a police officer testified that the Detroit Po-
lice Department's failure to properly discipline its officers was the
proximate cause of an officer shooting the victim." In a later part
of the opinion, the court analyzed the expert's methodology and
found it "as suspect as his conclusions." The court also con-
cluded that the expert lacked the qualifications needed to testify
on this matter. 5 The holding in this case and the analysis of the
expert's methodology are beyond reproach, as they are entirely
consistent with Daubert. Earlier in the opinion, however, the court
literally applied Daubert's four-prong test to the expert's testi-
mony 6 This analysis serves as an unintended demonstration of
how inapplicable the Daubert test is to nonscientific evidence.
288. See supra Part IV.A.
289. For a discussion of Daubert's four-part test as it pertains to Newtonian sci-
ence, see supra Part IV.A.
290. For a discussion of these factors, see infra Part V.
291. 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994).
292. See id. at 1348.
293. See id.
294. Id at 1352.
295. See id. (expert's "credentials as set forth in the record do not qualify him to
know any more about what effect claimed disciplinary shortcomings would have on
the future conduct of 5,000 different police officers than does any member of the
jury").
296. See id. at 1350-51.
[Vol. 30:1379
NONSCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY
The Berry court first inquired into whether the expert's dis-
cipline theory had been tested, and unsurprisingly discovered that
it had not.2 7 Unlike practitioners of Newtonian science, who seek
to replicate their experiments with consistent results, police offi-
cers cannot easily test their disciplinary theories. The court's ex-
amination of whether the theory is based on data, calculations or
observations, or whether the witness just made it up, is entirely
appropriate. But requiring the testing of such a behavioral theory
may not be feasible. It is doubtful that any single experiment
could conclusively show the effects of a failure to discipline police
officers over a period of time.
Next, the court looked at whether the disciplinary theory had
been subject to peer review and publication.9 Again, the Sixth
Circuit was disappointed by the result.29  The police officer
claimed to have written some articles and a textbook on jail ad-
ministration,3.0 but there was no testimony as to any peer review.
That comes as no surprise since a not-so-scientific theory on police
discipline would not have been submitted to the kind of peer re-
view that exists within the scientific community. Only in the for-
mal, traditional sciences is there an established practice of publi-
cation and peer review. While there are police journals that
publish articles on police discipline, there is no system of formal
peer review for these publications. Even when a nonscientific the-
ory is generally accepted, it may lack formal support from other
professionals in the field.
Finally, the court found no evidence of general acceptance of
the witness's theories.30 ' The Daubert Court talked about0_eneral
acceptance within the "relevant scientific community."3  The
Berry court itself stated later in its opinion that "there is no such
'field' as 'police policies and practices.""'3 3 One wonders in which
relevant community the Berry court wished to see the witness's
theory generally accepted.
As the Berry case demonstrates, Daubert's four factors do not
offer a useful measure of the reliability of nonscientific expert tes-
297. See id. at 1350.
298. See id
299. See id. at 1350-51.
300. The witness failed, however, to produce evidence of any of these publications
at trial. See id.
301. See id. at 1351.
302. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
303. Berry, 25 F.3d at 1352.
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timony. They were aimed at science and are applicable only to
science. Therefore, since Daubert's reliability principles are appli-
cable to all types of expert testimony, while its four factors are
applicable only to science, the Daubert Court must have intended
for courts to use different criteria in evaluating nonscientific expert
testimony.
V. APPLICATION OF DAUBERT'S RELIABILITY REQUIREMENT TO
NONSCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY
Although Daubert's general observations are dedicated to the
evaluation of scientific knowledge, the Court's analysis of what
constitutes knowledge is valuable in analyzing other types of ex-
pert testimony. The Daubert Court defined knowledge as "more
than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. ' 4 The Court
further stated that "[p]roposed testimony must be supported by
appropriate validation-Le., 'good grounds.""'3 5
It must be noted that Daubert does not require the judge to
evaluate the soundness of the expert's conclusions, only the
soundness of the way the expert arrived at those conclusions.0 ' In
other words, acting as a gatekeeper, the court's role is to ensure
that all evidence that passes through its doors has at least the ear-
marks of reliability. This does not require that the court verify, to
any degree of certainty, that the testimony is indeed valid-that
would not be feasible for judges who are not themselves experts in
the relevant field. More importantly, this is not the court's role.
At the conclusion of the Daubert opinion, the Court expressed its
confidence in "the capabilities'of the jury and of the adversary sys-
tem generally."3  Once the expert's testimony is held sufficiently
reliable to be admissible, its weaknesses will be fleshed out in the
ordinary course of trial proceedings, and the jury will assign it the
appropriate weight.0 ' But in order to have the requisite indicia of
304. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
305. Id.
306. See Kesan, supra note 18, at 2018 ("The Supreme Court in Daubert empha-
sized that 'the focus [of the trial judge's inquiry] must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate."' (alteration in original)
(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595)).
307. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596; see also Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., Judging the Ex-
pert, 55 OHiO ST. L.J. 1105, 1109 (1994) ("The gatekeeper's role boils down to assess-
ing reliability and credibility, in fairness to both sides, with a healthy respect for the
traditional function of the jury.").
308. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 ("Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
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reliability, the evidence must be based on "good grounds."3°9 That
determination requires more than mere examination of the ex-
pert's qualifications. In order to ensure that the testimony is
"more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation, 311 the
court must always ask how an expert reached a conclusion. The
court should examine both the data on which the expert relied, as
well as the methodology or reasoning the expert used in forming
the conclusion. Without this inquiry, a judge will not be able to
distinguish valid expert testimony from fancily worded specula-
tion.
A. Examining the Expert's Data
To assure the trial judge of the validity of their testimony, ex-
perts must always be able to point to specific data on which their
testimony is based. That data can come from the facts of the case,
measurements performed by an expert, specialized literature, in-
struction manuals, or even information obtained from an educa-
tional course. It may also come from the expert's personal experi-
ence."' Many nonscientific experts derive their expertise from
years of experience in a particular field . The court would have to
determine whether the expert's past experiences are sufficient in
quantity and quality to constitute reliable data on which the expert
can base the conclusions. For example, an experienced merchant
may wish to testify on the usage of trade in international commer-
cial transactions. The court must evaluate the number of years the
witness has been involved in international trade and whether this
experience is sufficient to enable the witness to reach a well-
grounded conclusion on the usage of trade.
The Daubert opinion reminds judges faced with the proffer of
expert testimony to be mindful of other applicable Evidence
Rules.3 Indeed, Rule 703 offers valuable guidance in this matter.
It allows the facts or data upon which the expert opinion is based
to be derived from first-hand observations, hypothetical questions,
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.").
309. See id at 590.
310. Id.
311. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 2289 ("Experience is to nonscientific ex-
perts as experimentation is to scientists.").
312. See id ("Nonscientific experts are 'experientially qualified.' Their experi-
ence largely is their expertise.").
313. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
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or information presented to the expert outside of the court, which
is "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field. ,1 4 Rule 703 thus assists a trial judge in deciding whether the
data used by an expert forms good grounds for an expert opinion.
The judge must ask whether the expert utilized the type of data
that other specialists in that field would rely upon in forming their
opinions. 5
The following cases help illustrate this point. In evaluating
the basis for an economist's expert testimony under Rule 702, the
Third Circuit considered the data used in a multiple regression
analysis, and found no evidence that the data was "incomplete or
inaccurate such that an economist would not rely on it."31 In a dif-
ferent case involving expert testimony by an economist, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the exclusion of proffered testimony because of
serious flaws in the expert's data. The expert sought to testify
about the shorter worklife expectancy of an oilfield worker based
on a study on the subject.318 The testimony was offered to establish
that the plaintiff was likely to have a shorter worklife and should
therefore not receive damages based on an average worklife.319
The court found the testimony "not sufficiently reliable" because
the study did not compare the worklife of an oilfield worker with
the national average or with the expected worklife of those in
other occupations.
Cook v. American Steamship Co.321 is an excellent example of
why it is necessary to always evaluate the data that forms the basis
for an expert's opinion. A rope-testing expert testified that a rope
supporting a plaintiff in a boatswain's chair broke because it had
been exposed to a "localized heat source."3 ' The expert had
worked for a testing laboratory for thirteen years.3 3 He had ex-
314. FED. R. EvID. 703.
315. "The physician makes life-and-death decisions in reliance upon [statements
by patients, medical reports, hospital records, and X-rays]. His validation, expertly
performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judicial purposes."
FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
316. Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224,
1238 (3d Cir. 1993).
317. See Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563,567-68 (5th Cir. 1994).
318. See id. at 567.
319. See id.
320. See id. at 568.
321. 53 F.3d 733 (6th Cir. 1995).
322. Id. at 739.
323. See id. at 738.
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pertise in stress and failure testing and was qualified as an expert
in testing under Rule 702.324 If qualifications were all that the
court had examined, the expert testimony would have been held
admissible. The court, however, went beyond the expert's qualifi-
cations, and discovered that there was no basis for the expert's
opinion.s He did not test the rope in question and had no data to
analyze.32 The court held the testimony inadmissible for failure to
"perform tests or otherwise call upon any 'scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge' that would have given him a valid
basis upon which to form his opinion."'32
Courts should never abandon an inquiry into the basis for an
expert's opinion simply because there is no numerical data to
analyze. In the legal profession, for example, the data on which a
legal expert relies would typically be nontechnical in nature, but it
is just as important to scrutinize that data for reliability. For in-
stance, in American International Adjustment Co. v. Galvin,3 8 an
issue of legal expertise came up in the summary judgment context.
The magistrate judge presiding over the malpractice trial granted
partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that
the defendant attorney had breached the standard of care as a
matter of law.3 29 The Seventh Circuit reversed the magistrate's
ruling based on the testimony from a legal expert stating that the
defendant was not negligent. 30 In his dissent Chief Judge Posner
criticized the majority's reliance on "an expert's conclusional
statements., 331 Judge Posner stated that to allow a defendant to
defeat a motion for summary judgment with an expert's unsub-
stantiated, "naked" conclusions would be "to confuse admissibility
with weight." 332 Judge Posner further asserted that Daubert "has
implications for nonscientific expert testimony., 333 To be admissi-
ble, expert testimony must adhere to the standards of intellectual
rigor required in the expert's profession, although what constitutes
324. See iL at 739.
325. See id. at 738-39.
326. See id.
327. Id. at 740.
328. 86 F.3d 1455 (7th Cir. 1996).
329. See id. at 1458.
330. See id. at 1462.
331. Id. at 1464 (Posner, J., dissenting).
332. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
333. See id. at 1465 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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that intellectual rigor will differ from field to field.3 4
Borrowing from the wisdom of Judge Posner's analysis, the
proper inquiry should be the following: What would other profes-
sionals in this field require experts to show by way of data to sup-
port their conclusions? For instance, legal professionals use re-
search to substantiate their legal conclusions. Statutes, cases,
treatises, and other materials constitute the data upon which prac-
ticing lawyers rely in forming their opinions. Lawyers are required
to cite to these materials in practice, and legal experts should be
required to do so in court.
B. Examining the Expert's Methodology
Having examined the expert's data, the court must consider
whether the expert's conclusions are reasonably based on that
data. This inquiry involves examining the validity of the expert's
methodology. The relevant question is whether the expert's way
of arriving at the conclusion has a basis in logic and is consistent
with the methods used by other experts in that field. In discussing
the weaknesses in the legal expert's testimony in Galvin, Judge
Posner said the following:
A lawyer who is asked to testify about the standard of
care in trying a personal injury case is not expected to
employ the scientific method, because he doesn't use that
method in his ordinary professional work. But he is ex-
pected to defend his conclusions with reasons. That is the
essence of professionalism. . . . Twice the majority
opinion remarks that the expert testified "repeatedly"
that [defendant] had not been negligent. That is true.
But a conclusion is not rationally strengthened by being
reiterated.335
An expert's methodology may involve a set of assumptions,
and courts must always scrutinize those assumptions for indicia of
reliability. For example, in Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Mar-
wick,336 an accounting expert, who used a discounted cash flow
analysis to reach his conclusions, assigned a zero value to projects
with low or negative net cash flow.337 The expert's method implied
that undeveloped land or a fully leased but as yet unoccupied of-
334. See id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
335. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
336. 2 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1993).
337. See id. at 186.
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fice building in the final stages of construction has no value be-
cause it has not yet produced any positive cashflow. 33s The court
found these assumptions unsound and inconsistent with accounting
norms.39 Similarly, in Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,34 the
District of Columbia Circuit held that an economist's expert testi-
mony regarding a helicopter crash victim's potential earnings was
inadmissible because it was based on speculative assumptions re-
garding the changes a victim might have made in his career or in-
vestments he might have made.34'
Other circuit cases discussed in Part III.C of this Comment of-
fer many examples of courts' analyses of expert methodology. 42
Courts have reviewed methods used by a civil engineer,34 real es-
tate appraiser,3" handwriting expert, economist,3"6 rare coins
evaluator,347 banker,3  and other nonscientific experts.349  The
analysis of the expert's methodology is at the heart of the Daubert
opinion, and courts must always give it their utmost attention.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Daubert decision clearly articulated the standard for
admissibility of scientific expert testimony, its scope with regard to
other types of expert evidence in Rule 702 remains unclear. The
circuit courts disagree on the application of Daubert's general
principles and its four-part test to nonscientific expert testimony.
One circuit court has literally applied Daubert's factors to nonsci-
entific testimony. Several courts have declined to screen nonsci-
338. See id.
339. See id. at 186-87.
340. 999 F.2d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
341. See id- at 568-69.
342. See supra Part III.C and accompanying notes.
343. See United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1079 (5th Cir. 1996)
(inspecting property and reviewing maps, photographs, and data).
344. See id. (inspecting property, looking at comparable sales, and discussing the
property with other professionals in the field).
345. See United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 850-51 (3d Cir. 1995)
(comparing identifiable individual characteristics of the questioned handwriting to
those of the submitted handwriting specimens).
346. See Joy, 999 F.2d at 568 (estimating the value of the helicopter crash victim's
real estate investments and potential lifetime earnings).
347. See United States v. Kayne, 90 F.3d 7,11-12 (1st Cir. 1996).
348. See Den Norske Bank AS v. First Nat'l Bank, 75 F.3d 49, 57-58 (1st Cir.
1996) (familiarizing with commercial agreements and personally observing industry
customs).
349. See supra Part III.C for other examples of expert methodology evaluation.
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entific expert testimony for reliability and continued to follow the
traditional, pre-Daubert approach that focuses on expert qualifi-
cations as a benchmark for admissibility.
The majority of courts, however, have assumed a more active
gatekeeping role and extended Daubert's reliability principles to
nonscientific expert testimony. This approach represents the trend
in federal courts. It is also an appropriate extension of Daubert's
general principles beyond the narrow context of scientific testi-
mony.
Daubert's four factors were formulated for Newtonian science,
and are typically not applicable to nonscientific bodies of knowl-
edge. But Daubert's reliability principles are just as pertinent
where nonscientific expert testimony is concerned. Expert esti-
mony, by its nature, falls outside the scope of knowledge and ex-
perience of an average juror. Thus, jurors find it difficult to accu-
rately weigh the reliability of this testimony and often tend to treat
it with unquestioning deference. In an era where a party can easily
purchase favorable expert testimony, such deference toward an
expert's opinion endangers the accuracy of the outcome of a trial.
Traditionally, courts have focused on an expert's qualifications as
a threshold determination of the admissibility of expert testimony.
This reliance on the expert's qualifications, however, does not
provide sufficient safeguards against speculative expert testimony.
To prevent introduction of unsubstantiated expert opinions, judges
must assume the more active gatekeeping role discussed in
Daubert.
The extension of Daubert's reliability principles to nonscien-
tific testimony requires a judge to take a vital step beyond expert
qualifications and directly examine the reliability of the expert's
methodology. Naturally, this gatekeeping inquiry should not rest
on Daubert's science-oriented factors, and its focus will inevitably
vary depending on the nature of the specialized expertise. But ir-
respective of the body of knowledge on which expert opinion is
based, courts must always require expert witnesses to support their
conclusions with the type of data and methodology that profes-
sionals in their field rely upon in making their decisions. Only
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through a careful examination of an expert's data and methodol-
ogy can a court fulfill its gatekeeping duty and ensure that a wit-
ness offers more than an unsupported speculation adorned with
the title of "expert opinion."
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